I. INTRODUCTION
According to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), biodiversity refers to "the variability among living organisms from all sources including. .. terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems."' The CBD divides this generalized definition of biodiversity into genetic diversity, species diversity, and ecosystem diversity. 2 Few other countries possess the same level of biodiversity as China. China is home to over 30,000 types of vascular plants and 6,347 vertebrates, accounting for 10% and 14% of the world's totals, respectively. China also has a wide variety of unique terrestrial habitat types." The United States is similar to China in size and also offers a high level of biodiversity, but still is not as diverse as China.' The U.S. is home to 4,529 types of vertebrates and 18,100 vascular plants. In total, the U.S. has documented more than 200,000 species of animals, plants, and fungi, representing more than 10% of all documented species worldwide."
The decline of biodiversity is accelerating throughout the world." While biodiversity loss is significant in the United States,'o the rate of loss is especially pronounced in China where ecosystem and species diversity is threatened by China's rapid economic development, which has already impacted environmental quality." Throughout China, river and lake sedimentation are increasing; lake and groundwater levels are decreasing; oasis and vegetation loss in arid areas is more common; natural forests are being cut; reclamation and destruction of grasslands continue; red tide is damaging the marine ecosystem; beach erosion and seawater encroachment are worsening; wildlife populations are decreasing; and many rare plant and animal species are in danger of extinction.12
Many environmental law articles about China focus on pollution control, yet few deal with natural resources law and conservation.
3 Part II of this Article provides a brief overview of Chinese biodiversity and conservation legislation, while Part III discusses the challenges facing biodiversity legislation in China. Despite China's legislative attempts to conserve its natural resources, and in turn, to protect biodiversity, Chinese law struggles to effectuate these goals due to implementation, enforcement, and public participation problems, and legislative tendencies to promote economic values rather than ecological ones. This Article suggests, in Part IV, that China can improve biodiversity legislation through increasing the public's role in conservation efforts, strengthening liability and enforcement mechanisms, improving administrative coordination, and developing an integrated legislative framework for future biodiversity and conservation action. 
"The leading causes of China's biodiversity loss are extensive agriculture, industrialization, illegal logging and land degradation. About one-third of China's farmland has been exploited from primary forestland and the use of pesticides as well as of chemical fertilizers has increased significantly. Despite reforestation efforts, China's overall amount of forest cover has decreased continually and grassland ecosystems face serious decline."). Moreover, China's "tremendous economic development" has "trigger[ed] a range of secondary impacts in ... biodiversity loss" because of a "dramatically increased demand" for energy and natural resources. Id. at 187.
12 See, e.g., id , at 187-99 (discussing how China's economic development has effected water quality and quantity, led to increased vegetation loss and desertification, and further threatened fragile ecosystems and wildlife populations); Joseph McMullin, Do Chinese environmental consequences to China's marine ecosystems as a result of increased pollution).
13 There are only a small number of English-language articles on Chinese natural resources law, as most scholarship is concerned with pollution control in China. See, e.g REV. 489, 490-91 (2002) (examininig China's "legal framework for wildlife and endangered species protection, and placing it in a larger context within the environmental law of China").
helped create and promote biodiversity legislation in China," but these legislative efforts face significant implementation challenges. As compared to the United States, China arguably has more legislation-including constitutional law-touching on biodiversity concerns. In addition, like the U.S., biodiversity and conservation concerns infiltrate a variety of natural resources and environmental laws.?'
In China, "biodiversity law" as a legal system, comprises four levels: 1) constitutional provisions adopted and amended by the National People's Congress (NPC);' 2) biodiversity-related laws that include a smorgasbord of environmental legislation enacted by the NPC or its Standing Committee; 394, 409 (1928) ) (explaining that Congress may only delegate legislative-type power to an agency if it constrains that power to conform with "'an intelligible principle'"). 21 For two such laws that address specific aspects of biodiversity in the United States see nature reserves, and 3) resource use and protection-all designations that are familiar to observers of U.S. natural resources law.
22

A. Ecosystem Protection and Conservation
Through a number of legislative actions, China has sought to improve ecosystem protection and conservation. In particular, China has passed laws for the purposes of: * Wildlife Conservation. Such conservation practices include establishing nature reserves in habitats where certain protected wild animals are living and propagating;n * Wild Plant Conservation. This is accomplished by establishing nature reserves, conservation stations, and posting signs around protected areas;24 * Forest Ecosystem Conservation. These policies encourage afforestation and conservation, and limit logging; 
III. CHALLENGES FACING EXISTING LEGISLATION
Despite attempts to conserve its natural resources and, in turn, protect biodiversity, Chinese law struggles in pursuit of these goals because it: 1) prioritizes economic values over ecological ones, 2) suffers from chronic implementation and enforcement problems, and 3) suffers from a lack of consistent and meaningful public participation.
A. Ecological Values
Similar to other countries, China's conservation and biodiversity legislation struggles to prioritize ecological values over economic ones. 42 As a civil law country, the textual objectives of Chinese laws and regulations determine their content. This, in turn, directly influences implementation, because these objectives determine the laws' implementation policies and approaches. At least three components of biodiversity are currently unprotected by existing legislation: genetic resources, biological species, and ecosystems. Rather than being managed according to their ecological value, these resources are currently managed according to their economic value.
For example, the Law on the Protection of Wildlife encompasses all "terrestrial and aquatic wildlife which are rare or near extinction and the species of terrestrial wildlife which are beneficial or of important economic or scientific value."" Thus, although this law is commonly regarded as a species conservation law, its objective squarely focuses on the importance of a species based on their rarity, particularity, and economic value, rather than the role that the species might play in the ecosystem as a whole." Similarly, "although the Grassland Law charges the State with generally improving the 'ecological environment,' it notably lacks any explicit reference to biodiversity or ecosystem health, despite major threats to these crucial aspects of ecology."
4 Chinese natural resources policy can therefore be characterized as management for the sake of productivity. 4 6 In terms of ecological protection, the stated objective in the Regulations on Nature Reserves is to strengthen the construction and management of these reserves; the purpose statement makes no mention of any potential biodiversity conservation provisions. 47 As a result, among China's provincial and national nature reserves, 22% are damaged due to "ecological tourism" development and 11% face other forms of resource degradation. Only 16% have environmental monitoring capabilities, and those that do have such monitoring equipment are only able to account for about 20% of their total number of visitors." Such problems also exist in wetlands legislation, with similar attention being devoted to natural resource utilization and economic value, rather than to ecological value. The objective of these laws is often to better develop and utilize wetlands, rather than to conserve their ecosystems. 5 China needs to avoid a "perverse set of incentives; the 43 
See generally Chen Hongjun, Discussion on Conflicts and Countermeasures of Wethand
Conservation of China, in 11 CONSUMPrIoN GUIDANCE 351 (2006) (discussing the impact of perceived need to exploit a nature reserve's biological diversity in order to fund its operation."" The Ramsar Convention," of which China is a signatory, emphasizes both conservation and "wise use" of wetlands, rather than focusing solely on either of those two extremes. 5 2 Such a notion is critical to biodiversity conservation in China.n
B. Implementation and Enforcement
In China, "most [environmental] laws are vague and ambiguous, reading more like policy statements than directives, which makes administration and enforcement difficult."" For example, weak and vague legislation, "[c]ombined with national directives and quotas to create more [nature reserves], regardless of local conditions," collectively subvert conservation values by "enabl[ing] local governments to create 'paper parks' based on unrealistic boundaries or land availability."" On the ground, Chinese natural resources conservation and biodiversity laws suffer from poor implementation and weak enforcement,u with the root causes being administrative inadequacies, poor management training, overreliance on international assistance, and insufficient liability for violators."
Furthermore, "[tihe organization of China's national bureaucracy is not conducive to effective implementation of biodiversity conservation laws and policies."8 For example:
In theory, the People's Republic of China operates as a unitary national state where legislation and directives emanate from central Beijing to which subnational units of governments must adhere. In practice, however, this high degree of administrative cohesion does not exist.... In reality, sub-national administrative departments ... tend to look to the people's governments at their own level than to central authorities, since their funding and enforcement powers rely on local district authorities." natural resource laws that favor utilization over protection on wetland biodiversity); Liu Xaiochun et al. There is no clear lead agency in control of all areas of conservation, and no clear line of authority on environmental law matters, which creates significant tension between national and provincial actors and institutions.6 For example, according to the Regulations on Nature Reserves, both the forestry and environmental protection administrations have authority over nature reserves management. However, as noted below, their functions are not defined clearly:
[The] environmental protection administration under the State Council is responsible for the integrated management of the nature reserves throughout the country. The... departments of forestry, agriculture, geology and mineral resources, water conservancy, and marine affairs and other departments concerned are responsible for relevant nature reserves under their jurisdiction.r' Here, the "integrated management" responsibility of the environmental protection administration and the responsibilities of the other departments are not clearly defined. For example, national environmental protection agencies may not be allowed to regulate some nature reserves because they could be operated by local forestry administrations who are unwilling to be inspected. This problem of coordination and cooperation between national administrative departments and local entities has resulted in inefficient management, supervision, and protection of nature reserves and natural resources, especially in local jurisdictions. As an illustration, in Hunan Province, the core zones of East Dongting Lake Reserve (the Reserve) are managed by Yueyang County. 62 The Reserve's environmental protection agency has no right to supervise Yueyang County managers, whose production and business operations have seriously damaged biodiversity in the Reserve.? Furthermore, conservation management and training in China's nature reserves remains poor," as "staff may be poorly trained and lack [the] understanding of ecological principles needed for decision making, leading to poor management standards."" "Although China has evinced, in law, regulation, and policy, a commitment to biodiversity conservation, the question is whether it has allocated sufficient organizational, human, and financial resources and 96 (2002) .
63 See id 64 McBEATH & LENG, supra note 30, at 113-15 ("Staff capacity was least satisfactory in areas such as ecosystem, habitat and species management, project development and management, and technology and information management, areas related to the prime function of nature reserves."); Nelson, supra note 45, at 401 ("A further reason for the creation of ecologically unsuitable [nature reserves] may be that local productivity-focused agriculture bureaus, which often administer [nature reserves], lack the knowledge and staff necessary to assess and recommend ecologically valuable sites.").
65 Nelson, supra note 45, at 404. created adequate incentives in practice to put the regime into effect."" Thus, China lacks-or the pressures of economic development have made it unwilling to invest-significant resources to implement biodiversity conservation measures. 6 1 "Local governments have insufficient funds to support [Nature Reserves (NRs)], particularly in poor northern and western grassland provinces .... [and they] often raise funds by allowing officially illegal developments such as hotels within NRs, compromising conservation aims."" Similarly, "[tihe central government's primary contribution to funding nature reserves has been to pay for infrastructure-construction of buildings such as offices, rescue centers, tourist facilities, roads, and sometimes zoos or botanical gardens"-it generally does not pay for improved conservation management."
Current biodiversity legislation and policies in China have been driven-and greatly influenced-by existing international biodiversity law. 0 Although China's outward commitment to international law is laudable, in the context of conservation, the country's domestic conservation strategy lacks long-term viability because it has become overly dependent and reliant on international financial resources and technical support. ' In terms of enforcement, some Chinese laws and regulations lack liability clauses, and this is particularly true concerning biodiversity conservation legislation. Although penalty provisions have been included in relevant laws and regulations regarding the illegal trade of wild animals and plants, most provisions lack the necessary specificity required for administrative and judicial enforcement. While quantified standards are proposed in various Chinese law treatises and criminal sentencing guidelines, some of these standards are still difficult to implement by the management or judicial bodies. 72
C Pubhc Participation
Public participation is regarded as a basic principle in China, 73 yet such participation is limited in practice. Biodiversity conservation in China is mainly pushed forward by government interests, rather than by grassroots efforts." With limited financial and human resources, it is difficult for governmental departments to accomplish the objectives of biodiversity conservation-a reality that emphasizes the need for greater public participation. For example, there are only general provisions on public participation in the Law on Desert Prevention and Transformation' and other related legislation. However, there are no specific measures to encourage public participation in addressing the issue of desertification prevention and control. Furthermore, when any such public process is infringed, the framework for providing remedies is similarly ill-defined.'
IV. IMPROVING CHINA'S NATURAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION AND BIODIVERSITY LEGISLATION As stated in the previous Part, existing legislation focuses more on economic values rather than on biodiversity, and the public has only played a limited role in the country's natural resources conservation regime. Chinese biodiversity and natural resources conservation legislation suffers from a lack of liability and enforcement provisions, as well as a death of administrative coordination.
A. Paticipation and Incentives
Despite the importance of public involvement in, and awareness of, the conservation movement in China, the scope of public participation in environmental protection is limited." Given the fast pace of economic development in China, greater public participation in natural resources conservation law is a much needed counterweight to the negative effects of industrialization and limited government resources. However, increased public participation faces at least two roadblocks. "First and uppermost is http://english.mep.gov.cn/PoliciesRegulations/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2012)("The state encourages relevant entities, experts and the general public to participate in the appraisal of the environmental impacts in appropriate ways."); id. art. 21 ("Unless it is provided by the state that it is necessary to keep confidential ... construction projects which may impose significant environmental impacts and for which it is necessary to work out a report of environmental impacts, the construction entity shall, before submitting the construction project for examination and approval, seek the opinions of relevant entities, experts and the general public by holding demonstration meetings, hearings or by any other means."). 74 suggests that construction administrations should provide environmental information such that the public has the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process.n In addition, the resolution provides that opinions that are relevant to the public's environmental interests should be heard in other forums as well." There is still a long way to go in setting up an effective public participation framework in China. Future biodiversity legislation should articulate the methods and procedures for public participation, including measures for organizing public hearings on important decisions and policies that may affect biodiversity prior to decision making and project construction. Such legislation should also provide relevant information to the public in a timely manner, encourage environmental non-governmental organizations to participate in biodiversity conservation, promote public participation in biodiversity-related legislation processes, and allow for citizen suits in civil actions. These provisions should be clearly written in existing and future biodiversity and natural resources laws.8
B. Liability
Existing biodiversity legislation does not provide enough deterrence against violators in China; thus, extending liability will improve enforcement of existing provisions. "Fees and fines are rarely determined authoritatively; instead, they are often negotiated and fall far below the cost of damage that the harmful activity has caused, as well as below expenses for pollution control facilities."" Future amendments to criminal law statutes should include heightened liability reforms to punish violations of conservation and biodiversity laws. These provisions could be added to various parts of China's existing criminal law. 87 Reforms could include criminal proceedings for the destruction of biodiversity, along with such penalties as forfeiture and imprisonment.
Meanwhile, enacting a specific Environmental Damage Compensation Law would be a crucial step toward improving the enforcement provisions in China's biodiversity laws;" additionally, the success of this law would likely improve the liability schemes of other existing laws. This law should clearly provide a means of holding government agencies liable for neglecting their duties under China's biodiversity conservation laws-such a scheme would serve as a supplement to the provisions of China's codified Tort Law and General Principles of the Civil Law." 
C. Legislative andAdministrative Coordination
What is particularly concerning in the biodiversity and natural resources protection context is the administrative overlap between various government agencies in China's bureaucracy. There is no clear delineation between many of the agencies involved in enacting and enforcing these laws, including: the Environmental and Resources Protection Committee under National People's Congress (ERPC), the State Council and its Legislative Affairs Office (LAO), the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), the Ministry of Agriculture and the State Forestry Administration. At the central government level, protective functions are divided among a large number of agencies, each with different missions. Some scholars have argued that Chinese laws and regulations do not provide for effective coordination among these agencies." The problem is not the functions and responsibilities of these bodies under existing law, but is instead the need for these agencies to fully perform their respective roles during the processes of legislation and law enforcement. There are a number of steps that can be taken to address the issue of ineffective administrative coordination. . First, the coordination between the ERPC and other legislative departments could be enhanced by increasing the responsibilities of the ERPC under Chinese law. Considering the above-stated problems with intergovernmental coordination, the ERPC-as an agency without any economic ties to the industrial sector-is ideally placed to further biodiversity legislation and coordinate local efforts.
Comprehensive biodiversity legislation could be created by the ERPC with participation from relevant administrative departments and other stakeholders. Thus, the ERPC 9 ' can play a leading role in the legislative process, avoiding the problems and inefficiencies caused by departmentdominant legislating. As mentioned above, the ERPC has no special economic interests in biodiversity use and conservation, so it may be in a neutral position when conflicts arise. Currently, departments that do have economic interests in resource utilization and development-such as the Ministry of Agriculture and the State Forestry Administration-play leading roles in the legislation process.
Current legislative inefficiencies due to these competing interests result in lengthy negotiations and awkward coordination between the participating departments. Unless these parties come to an agreement, the LAO will not accept any legislative proposals, nor will they be discussed by the State Council, the NPC, or its standing committee. To avoid this situation, more legislative processes should be organized through the ERPC.
Second, with the help of the LAO, coordination between the MEP and other governmental departments could also be improved. "The problem of vertical integration is much more intractable, and mirrors the difficulty China has faced in coordinating economic development activities from the center to provinces and local governments."
2 The MEP can seek cooperation and support from other departments to facilitate the legislative and law enforcement process, but when disagreement arises, the LAO can act as an arbitrator between the parties. In China, the LAO is responsible for reviewing legislative proposals and deciding which should be submitted to the NPC or its standing committee for further review. In practice, when various departments disagree over a proposal, the LAO will usually instruct them to make further efforts to reach a final agreement. Due to the competing interests discussed above, this kind of agreement is often not possible. In such situations, LAO should not require additional negotiation and coordination among missionoriented agencies, but instead play a more active role in defining the final proposal in the biodiversity legislation process.
V. CONCLUSION AND FINAL PROPOSAL
China's existing legislation creates challenges to conserving the country's natural resources and protecting its biodiversity. Chinese law remains unsuccessful in pursuit of these goals due to inadequate public participation, implementation and enforcement problems, and legislative prioritization of economic-as opposed to ecological-values. Despite these challenges, China can improve biodiversity legislation through increasing the public's role in conservation efforts, enhancing liability and enforcement measures, and improving administrative coordination in order to implement these suggested and existing enforcement provisions.
Even with improvement under the current legal regime, in order to make additional progress, China may have to pursue an integrated legislation framework-something that does not exist in the United States. This new framework, from a legislative standpoint, would adopt the g3 definitions and principles of the Convention on Biological Diversity' allowing for their implementation through national and local administrative law, financial support, public participation, and ecological compensation. This framework could be integrated into existing national laws, such as 92 MCBEATH & LENG, supra note 30, at 110. 0 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 1. Article 2 states: "'Biological diversity' means the variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems."
